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Nation and Empire Building 
 
The modern concepts of nation, nationalism and state are actually quite 
problematic and open to many interpretations none of which has achieved a universally 
accepted status. The problems associated with these have already been studied quite 
adequately by Eric Hobsbawn
1
. It is therefore unnecessary to attempt to invent  
the wheel again. The fact that even such nations that have supposedly been built on 
nationalistic principles (e.g. France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Estonia, Iran, 
India, China) do not actually follow those in practice proves this to be the case – all 
nations include linguistic or religious minorities or peoples of other ethnic origins not 
to mention nations that have not been built on the basis of nationalistic principles at all 
like e.g. the USA, Canada, Australia, most of the states in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Indonesia, Belgium, Monaco, and Vatican. It is also quite clear that the nations have 
always been built from the top down, but in such a manner that it answers the hopes, 
needs, wishes and interests of those whose opinions matter – the latter vary from one 
time and place to another. In some cases this means only the upper classes or those 
with military power while in other cases this also includes the common people.  
The typical unifying factors among those are commonly shared language, history, 
culture, shared experiences and religion or ideology all of which have been used to 
rally the upper classes and/or people behind the forces that attempt to unite the so-
called nation under their leadership. In most cases this process involves also the 
purposeful falsification of history and facts for propaganda purposes. The following 
analysis proves that all of the above markers existed also in the past. 
 
                                                          

 ilkkasyvanne@yahoo.com; The writing of this article has been generously supported by a 
2017 ASMEA Research Grant. 
 
1 HOBSBAWN 1992.  
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The Emergence of Ardašīr the Priestly Warrior from Fārs 
 
At the beginning of the third century, when Ardašīr I succeeded as prince  
of Fārs, Iran was experiencing one of its most tumultuous periods in its long history. 
The ruling Arsacid dynasty came from the Iranian speaking tribe of Parthians, but they 
were not considered as Iranians proper in Fārs. When the ruling Arsacid dynasty  
then suffered a series of humiliating defeats in their wars against the Romans, they did 
not only loose the support of the Iranians proper but eventually also the support  
of the seven Parthian noble families. The final nail in their coffin was the civil war 
between Walagaš and Ardavān. 
The genealogy of Ardašīr, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, is obscured by 
the many different versions in existence. According to one version, he was the son  
of Pābag, king of Xīr, and grandson of Sāsān, a great warrior, and the head priest  
of the Anāhid Fire Temple of Eṣṭaḵr, and related by marriage to the Bāzarangi family. 
According to another version, Ardašīr’s father was actually Sāsān who had married  
to Pābag’s daughter, but that Ardašīr became Pābag’s son through adoption.  
This version claims that Dārā (Darius III) was one of Sāsān’s ancestors making Ardašīr 
legitimate successor of the Achaemenids. In fact, the Roman and later Middle Persian 
and Persian texts prove that the Sasanians claimed Achaemenid ancestry, but they did 
not stop at this but also claimed that the mythical Kayanids were their ancestors
2
.  
Still another version given by Agathias claims that Pābag had placed his own wife into 
Sāsān’s bed so that they would produce offspring. It is possible that the family  
of Sāsān originally came from the east and had Sacae-tribal ancestry and was therefore 
probably related to the house of the Sūrēns. On the basis of Ardavān’s supposed letter, 
Sāsān’s ancestors may also have included Kurds.3 What is certain, however, is that 
from the very beginning the Sasanians claimed Achaemenid ancestry and identified 
themselves strongly with the Iranian past and with its Zoroastrian religion and also 




The sources (e.g. Ferdowsī, Ṭabarī, Mīrkhwānd, Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī 
Pābagān; Baḷʿamī) for the early career of Ardašīr are equally poor and give several 
different versions. However, what appears certain is that Ardašīr Pābagan’s official 
father Pābag served as the Guardian of the Fire in Fārs, which enabled him to use its 
                                                          
2 DARYAEE 2008: 66-67. 
3 DARYAEE (2010: 6) notes the possible eastern origins of the house of Sāsān. POURSHARIATI (2008: 
155-156) has speculated that by the late sixth century at least part of the Sūrēn family had become so 
enmeshed with the Persian House that they had adopted the title Pārsīg. On the basis of this, it is possible 
to speculate that the Sūrēns and Pābag had formed an alliance in which the Sacea-Parthian-Persian-Kurd 
origin of Ardašīr (a mix of Sūrēns and Pābagians/ Bāzarangi) was suppressed beneath the legendary 
accounts. In short, the idea of mixing the ancestral records was probably to hide the truth – i.e. that Ardašīr 
was not really a purebred Iranian from Persis/Fars, which he pretended to be. 
4 Ṭabarī 813-815; Agathias, 2.27.1-5; KREYENBROEK 2008: 8-9; HUFF 2008: 31-54. 
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priests as his own secret operatives. We also know that Bāzarangi, the King of Persis 
and relative of Ardašīr, appointed Ardašīr as a military governor of Dārābgerd in 
eastern Fārs and that Ardašīr enlarged his territories through raiding and killing as a 
result of which he gathered around him a group of loyal friends, followers and trusted 
soldiers. It was then that Ardašīr convinced his father Pābag to assassinate Bāzarangi5. 
After the assassination, Pābag demanded that Ardavān would appoint his eldest son 
Šāpur as ruler of Persis. Ardavān refused. The Sasanians were now considered rebels, 
but there was not much that Ardavān could do about it because by this time (c. 213) he 
appears to have revolted against Walagaš. After this followed a power struggle within  
the Sasanian family from which Ardašīr emerged as the victor. The ongoing Parthian 
civil war made it possible for Ardašīr to secure the core areas with further conquests.6 
It was after this that Ardašīr set about immediately to reorganize his realm. At 
the heart of his project was the systemization of the Zoroastrian beliefs and traditions 
to serve his own goals. This was certainly necessary because the extant sources suggest 
that Ardašīr faced a series of plots at the very beginning of his reign, but the loyalty  
of the clergy and the core followers enabled Ardašīr to crush all of these.7  
The information provided by the Nāma-ye Tansar, Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī 
Pābagān and Agathias gives us a very good picture of how Ardašīr created what can 
justifiably be called a theocracy under his rule and that it was this that ultimately 
secured his position.
8
 The Nāma-ye Tansar claims to respond to the critique  
of Ardašīr’s policies presented by Gushnasp Jushnasf in the immediate aftermath of  
the death of Ardavān. Gushnasp accused that Ardašīr: 1) had made religious 
innovations; 2) had extinguished the royal fires of the other kings; 3) had forsaken  
the traditions
9
; 4) had made innovations in law; 5) was cruel; 6) prevented social 
mobility; 7) had forbid intermarriage between common people and nobles; 8) had 
                                                          
5 DARYAEE (2010, 3) dates the overthrow of Gōzihr Bāzarangi to the years 205-206 before the revolt of 
Ardavān against Walagaš, but I would date it to a later period. 
6 Ferdowsī, 529-553; Mīrkhwānd, 274-276; Ṭabarī 813-817; Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī Pābagān; Balami, 66-
71; HUFF 2008: 32-35.; SHAHBAZI 2002.  
7 Ṭabarī 816-817; Mīrkhwānd, 276; DARYAEE 2010: 70-71; HUFF 2008: 35-54; For the Sasanian 
religious doctrines and practices in general, see DARYAEE 2010: 69-97. 
8 The following discussion is my summary of the contents of Agathias (II 26.2-5.), Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī 
Pābagān and the Nāma-ye Tansar, but in such a manner that I present the case through the contents of  
the Letter (its contents are in agreement with the former). POURSHARIATI (2008: 321-395) and most  
of the secondary sources she sites argue that the kingship and religion did not form the twin basis  
of Ardashir’s rule as claimed in the Testament of Ardashir on the grounds that the religious doctrine 
underwent constant changes and because there existed many other religions within the empire. This sort  
of analysis does not take into account the fact that all religions are in a constant state of change and that 
there will always be religious minorities in all territories regardless of what measures the state uses to 
suppress those. In short, I agree with those historians who accept this duality as presented by the extant 
sources. 
9 DARYAEE (2008) notes that it is possible that Ardašīr did not necessarily recognize which were 
innovations or borrowings in his idea of kingship. 
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forbid lavish spending
10
; 9) had forbid exaction of money from the wealthy and 
merchants (this secured Ardašīr the support of both); 10) used spies and informers; 11) 
and had not appointed a successor.  
According to the Nāma-ye Tansar, the above was not Ardašīr’s fault, but  
the fault of Alexander the Great who had destroyed religious books and had introduced 
new customs which had resulted in chaos and violence. It was because of this that 
Ardašīr was forced to resort to the use of violence and had to introduce innovations so 
that he could correct the situation. In other words, Ardašīr sought to achieve  
the restoration of the ancient Persian culture and religion that had existed before  
the death of the Achaemenid Darius III by falsifying both to suit his own political 
needs. According to both the Nāma-ye Tansar and Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī Pābagān, 
Ardašīr saw the alliance between the Zoroastrian religion and his house to be  
the foundation stone of the whole empire. It is also quite obvious that Ardašīr’s 
underlying motives for the things mentioned above were: a) to gain the support of the 
nobles (clergy, military, and scribes) and merchant class
11
; b) to obtain money and 
services from the common people for the upkeep of the empire and its upper classes. 
All this was excused on the grounds that the Zoroastrian religion supposedly required 




In sum, Ardašīr’s reincarnated ancient Iranian nation in Persis was based on  
a theocracy ruled by him and by his family in which the history and religion were 
modified to suit his purposes. The nobles and merchants provided the necessary 
support for this, and their support was secured through their privileged position and 
their indoctrination into the Zoroastrian faith. The Zoroastrian clergy and the security 
apparatus (informers, spies and soldiers) were used to exercise tight control over  
the entire population, including the nobles and merchants. 
 
Ardavān Reacts and the Battle of Hormzdagān on April 28, 224 
 
In about 223, after having defeated Walagaš, Ardavān finally reacted to  
the news of the revolt by insulting Ardašīr as a Kurd and then by dispatching two 
armies against the upstart. Ardašīr did not wait for their arrival. He stated to his 
followers that it had been the God who had made him king and had helped him defeat 
                                                          
10 The lavish spending and luxuries were forbidden on the grounds that the public show of wealth was only 
allowed according to the rank the person held in the society.  
11 Note the similarities in policy between modern and ancient Iran. It is unlikely to be a coincidence  
that the modern Iran is similarly built upon the support of the clergy, Revolutionary Guard, military, and 
the merchants of the “bazaar”. 
12 For a fuller analysis of the intelligence gathering and internal security, see SYVÄNNE 2016:  
(the writing of which was generously supported by the ASMEA Research Grant). See also for example: 
Siāsat-nāma, 66-67; BOSWORTH 1988. 
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his enemies and that the God would grant him victory
13
. After this, he marched against 
the enemy with the result that one of the enemy commanders deserted to his side.  
This was a sign of the times. In the course of the civil war Ardavān had punished many 
of the leading families for their support of Walagaš and they were now ready to pay in 
kind. It was thanks to this that Ardašīr was able to defeat both of the armies sent by 
Ardavān with ease14. 
Ardašīr challenged Ardavān to fight him in a place chosen by him. Ardavān’s 
position was so precarious that he was forced to accept the challenge. The council of 
Parthian nobles had demanded nothing less than that Ardavān would hand over his 
power to Ardašīr. Ardašīr won the battle and was proclaimed the šāhanšāh (king of 
kings) on the battlefield
15
. 
Ardašīr I consolidates his position 
 
The sources give conflicting information of how Ardašīr exploited his victory 
over Ardavān, but all of these seem to agree that Ardašīr ordered all magnates, petty 
kings and satraps to submit under his rule. Most appear to have answered in  
the affirmative, but the locations of Ardašīr’s subsequent campaigns prove that he was 
still forced to campaign against several important Parthian magnates. However, having 
defeated these, he always exploited his military victory with a show of clemency  
and restored back to them their traditional privileges and lands, and it was this that 
ultimately secured their loyalty. In other words, Ardašīr used a big stick and carrot 
approach. These sources also confirm that he secured first the western territories with  
a military campaign. The only area that he was unable to conquer was Armenia, 
because it was defended by its king Xusrō the Great. Xusrō was even able to take 
control of Ctesiphon, the capital of Parthia, but he lost it to Ardašīr by 227.  
Of particular note is that fact that in the course of these operations Ardašīr formed  
an alliance with the Kings of Adiabene and Kirkuk and king Baba of the Aramaic 
speaking “Iraqis”. This gives some credence to Ardavān’s insulting name Ardašīr  
 “the Kurd”. He was indeed supported by the kings of “Kurdistan”16.  
The reaction of the local populations to the change of ruler was mixed. Some 
of the Christian Arabs belonging to the Qudaah tribes disliked the prospect of being 
subjects of Ardašīr and fled and joined the Qudaah tribes who were already in Roman 
Syria. They preferred to be subjects of the Roman Empire at a time when the Christians 
                                                          
13 For the Sasanian concept of kingship, see DARYAEE 2008: 60-70. 
14 Ṭabarī 818; Ferdowsī, 536-542. 
15 Ṭabarī 818-9; Mīrkhwānd, 276-277. Ferdowsī, 536-542; Nāma-ye Tansar, 4-6; Masʻūdī, 142; 
Agathangelos, 11-14; HUFF 2008: 38. 
16 Ṭabarī 819; Baḷʿamī, 71-75; Mīrkhwānd, 277-278; The Chronicle of Arbela, 8; Ferdowsī, 542-554;  
Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī Pābagān, 5; Agathangelos, 19-23; Moses of Khorenatsʿi, II 67-73.  
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were not yet persecuted
17. This, however, is not the whole picture because Ardašīr 
followed a policy of religious tolerance to make it easier to conquer new territories
18
. 
In the following years (c.226-227) Ardašīr subdued the eastern territories  
and conquered al-Baḥrayn in about ca. 228. Consequently, it took until 228 for Ardašīr 
to secure the areas that had previously recognized Parthian rulers. This gave him access 
to the entire trade network and to most of the manpower of these areas, both of which 
were needed in the forthcoming wars. The only thorn in his flesh was Armenia with its 
Arsacid ruler Xusrō the Great19.  
We are now in a position to summarize what tools Ardašīr used in the securing 
of Iran and most of the territories of Parthian Empire: 
1) In about 211-213 he obtained a loyal core of supporters consisting of: a) the soldiers 
who had fought with him; b) the Zoroastrian clergy loyal to his family; c) the Persians 
of Persis loyal to his family and whose support he could rely upon against the foreign 
Parthians; d) the merchants of Persis that gave him access to a fleet of ships. 
2) In about 213-223/4 he exploited the civil war between Walagaš and Ardavān so that 
he was able to secure a base of operations in a situation in which Ardavān had proven 
himself unable to protect even the holy sites of the Zoroastrian faith. 
3) In about 224-228 he exploited the dissatisfaction of the Parthian/Persian nobility, 
merchants, clergy and populace against Ardavān’s policies and his persecution  
of the Parthian magnates loyal to Walagaš. After Ardašīr had subdued all resistance, he 
secured the support of the seven major Parthian families by giving them back their 
privileges that Ardavān had abolished. These privileges were based on the laws  
of the Achaemenid ruler Darius I who had been the first to grant all of the major 
offices of the empire to the seven families that had supported him
20
. During this stage 
of his campaign Ardašīr’s goal was the securing of all those domains that were or had 
been ruled by the families that had Arsacid blood in their veins or had recognized their 
suzerainty, but this was clearly not the limit of his territorial ambitions. His next targets 
of attack were the territories previously held by the Achaemenids.  
4) It was during this same time period that Ardašīr secured the conquered territory with 
a well-organized intelligence gathering apparatus, which consisted either  
of the members of the Zoroastrian clergy or of persons thoroughly indoctrinated  
by them, but he did not stop at this. Ardašīr indoctrinated the entire populace with 
                                                          
17 In fact Severus Alexander and his mother were both interested in the Christian faith.  
18 Chronicle of Arbela, 8, Ṭabarī 821-822, 833-834. 
19 Ṭabarī 819-820; Kār-nāmag ī Ardašīr ī Pābagān, 6; Mīrkhwānd, 278; BOSWORTH in Ṭabarī (p. 16,  
n. 61) notes that the name of the king of Bahrain Sanatruq is Parthian suggesting the likelihood that he was 
a vassal of the Arsacids. I do not agree with FRYE (1983: 121-124) that Gilan and the coast of the Caspian 
Sea (Gurgan/Hyrcania) did not submit to Ardašīr, because the name Gilan King appears for the first time 
in the reign of Šāpur who installed his son, the later king Bahrām I, as its ruler. Ṭabarī clearly implies that 
the areas that he mentioned were conquered and Movsēs Khorenats is quite specific that all of the Parthian 
clans except the Kārins supported Ardašīr, which means that the ruling family of Gurgan/Hyrcania 
supported them too. 
20 E.g. Theophylact, III 18. 9.  
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religious propaganda and falsified national myths/history which were later codified as 
the official history of the Sasanian realm
21
.  
The spreading of Ardašīr’s version of Zoroastrian faith meant the introduction 
of strict social control in which the society was divided into four (or five?) major castes 
(clergy, warriors, bureaucrats, and the common people) in which everything was 
controlled by the magi. The fact that the high priest Kerdīr used only Middle Persian in 
his inscriptions, the language of Persis, is highly suggestive that Ardašīr’s 
Zoroastrianism was the version practiced in Persis
22
. This is also highly suggestive of 
the importance of the Iranian nationalism in the initial stage of Ardašīr’s rise to power. 
Ardašīr also appears to have divided his subjects along the ‘racial’ lines into Iranians 
and non-Iranians, which is proven by the concepts Ērān and Anērān. 
 
Ardašīr I the “Achaemenid” 
Invasion of Roman Territory in 229-330 
 
Ardašīr followed up his successes by invading the Roman territories  
in ca. 229/330. According to the Roman sources, Ardašīr proclaimed to be  
the legitimate successor of the Achaemenids and the legal owner of their lands.
23
 
Despite not yet having defeated the Armenians, the timing of the attack was opportune 
because the Roman army in the East was in the middle of a mutiny. Of note is also  
the fact that there were Zoroastrian communities within the Roman territory in Syria, 
Asia Minor and Cappadocia and that the Persians were probably in contact with 
these
24. It is therefore not surprising that Ardašīr managed to gain the upper hand and 
pillage Mesopotamia and Cappadocia and threaten Syria, but he was still forced to 
                                                          
21 Even if there is no firm evidence for this in the sources, it is more than likely that in the initial stages  
of the nation building the official history of Iran did not yet bypass the Parthians and most of the 
Achaemenid history in the way we find it in Ferdowsī’s Šhāh-nāma. The reasons for this conclusion are: 
1) The Parthian Arsacids were still in power; 2) The Roman sources state quite clearly that Ardašīr used in 
his propaganda Achaemenid history. The change in the writing of official history must therefore have 
taken place when it became apparent to the Sasanians that they could not use Achaemenid history to their 
own advantage. The likeliest date for this change in propaganda is the reign of Yazdgerd I (399-420)  
who was the first to adopt the title Kai, which connected the Sasanian kings to the mythical Kayanids.  
The apparent reason for the change was that Yazdgerd maintained peace with the Romans and therefore 
did not have any need for the use of the Achaemenid propaganda. The use of the Kai in the title mentioned 
by POURSHARIATI (2008: 335). For details of these later events, see SYVÄNNE 2015b (written with 
the generous support of the ASMEA Research Grant). 
22 The use of the language of Persis in POURSHARIATI 2008: 333. 
23 For Ardašīr’s Achaemenid rhetoric, see EDWELL 2008: 156-160; SHAHBAZI 2001. Contrary to what 
Edwell states, I do not think that the revocation of the Achaemenid past would have been meant to serve 
only as rhetorical propaganda by Ardašīr. The fact that Ardašīr was unable to attain the goals that he 
publicly set on himself is not evidence that he did not have those goals.  
24 EDWELL (2008: 159) after Kerdīr’s inscription. I would suggest that these communities also provided 
intelligence reports for the Persians. 
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evacuate the Roman territory in 230. Consequently, it is probable that the Achaemenid 
and Zoroastrian propaganda did have a positive impact, but it was not decisive because 
there were not enough Zoroastrians in the Roman territories to make the difference in  
a situation in which the Persian army failed to defeat the Romans decisively
25
. The lack 
of popular uprisings proves that the Achaemenid propaganda had just as little attraction 
for the peoples of Roman east as the Ottoman propaganda of today’s Turkey has 
among the Arabs of Middle East. These peoples did not yearn to become subject 
nations of a Persian/Zoroastrian theocracy when they had been under the much more 
benign Roman rule for well over two centuries.  
 
Roman Counter-Strike in 231-232 
 
The Roman response was to prepare a massive invasion of Iran, but the poor 
planning and coordination of three separate armies enabled Ardašīr to engage each  
of those separately. This time, in imitation of the Achaemenids, Ardašīr fielded  
a military force, which included scythed war chariots and elephants. The war ended in 
a stalemate, but the poor performance of the scythed war chariots led to their 
abandonment. It was impossible to reintroduce successfully outdated pieces of military 
hardware and tactics solely on the basis that these harked back to the good old times  




The Final Years of the Founding Father 
 
The Roman and Iranian empires remained at peace until ca. 239-240 when  
the Persians appear to have invaded Roman territory once more and this time they were 
able to take Nisibis, Singara and Hatra before the end of 240. In about 240 Ardašīr 
appointed his son Šāpur as šāhanšāh so that he was free to devote his last moments on 
earth for the preparation of his eventual death which came in about 241/2. The war was 
continued under Šāpur I in 240-241/227. 
 
Šāpur I of the Hosts (240/242-271) 
The Beginning of Šāpur I’s Rule in 241/2-248 
 
The first thing Šāpur I needed to do after the death of his father was to secure 
the support of the “great men” of the empire. With the exception of Pērōz of Kārin in 
                                                          
25 Sources collected in DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 17-33. 
26 Sources collected in DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 26-28; SYVÄNNE 2017: 311-324. 
27 Sources collected in DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 32-35 with notes 354-355. See also MAKSYMIUK 
2015: 29-31; FRYE 1983: 124-125. GHIRSMAN (1978: 191) has suggested that the Sasanians managed 
to defeat the Armenians after a war that lasted ten years, but this seems to be an overstatement of the facts 
because Xusrō was still fighting against Persia during the reigns Philip, Decius, Gallus and Valerian.  
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the east, the other great men offered their loyalty. The disloyalty of Pērōz is not 
surprising in light of the fact that the Kārins had previously sided with Ardavān and 
then with Xusrō the Great. It is quite probable that in this case the Romans, who now 
invaded Persia under the nominal leadership of Gordian III, and the Armenians  
and Kārins all cooperated. As long as the Romans were led by the praetorian prefect 
Timesitheus in 242-243, they were successful, but when the young Gordian assumed 
the leadership in 244, the Roman campaign ended in utter defeat. When Gordian died 
in uncertain circumstances, he was succeeded by Philip the Arab who negotiated  
a peace settlement with Šāpur. This gave Šāpur the chance to crush Pērōz, but Philip 
did not abide by his agreement and continued to support the Armenians. On top of this, 
Šāpur was unable to defeat Pērōz militarily, but he was still able to bring the war to  
a successful conclusion thanks to the poisoning of Pērōz by a Persian special operative. 




Šāpur I’s Wars and Manichaeism from 249 until ca. 271/2 
 
After having pacified the east, Šāpur I appears to have decided to punish  
the Romans for their breach of peace terms. Šāpur inflicted a series crushing defeats on 
the Romans from 249 until roughly 256, which are recorded in Šāpur I’s inscription 
known as the ŠKZ. The Roman counter attack under Valerian halted the yearly 
invasions temporarily, but in about 259/260 Šāpur defeated and captured Valerian 
alive. It was also during the 250s that Šāpur was able to assassinate Xusrō the Great 
and add Armenia, Albania, and Iberia into the Persian Empire. The Historia Augusta 
suggests that the Armenians and Bactrians once again changed sides after the capture 
of Valerian in about 260, which proves again the strong resistance of the Armenians, 
Kārins and Kushans against the Sasanians. Šāpur naturally made them all pay dearly 
for their disloyalty. The Roman counter attack led by Ballista and the Palmyran 
Odaenathus, however, turned the tables in 260 so that Odaenathus was eventually able 
to advance twice against Ctesiphon before his murder in 267
29
.  
The fact that Mani was accompanying Šāpur on his military campaigns  
in the west suggests that Šāpur used Mani’s universal religious message as a weapon to 
weaken the enemy resistance. The best proof of this is the Roman accusation that  
the Manicheans were pro-Persian fifth-columnists. Of particular note is also the fact 
that Šāpur appears to have respected the sanctity of religious temples and shrines 
during his campaigns. The respect that he showed to the local religions in conjunction 
with the universality of Mani’s teachings was obviously meant to make it easier for the 
                                                          
28 Ṭabarī 826; Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 72, 2.87; Chronicle of Arbela 9; Zonaras, 12.19; DODGEON, LIEU 
1991: 354-359.  
29 Movsēs Khorenats'i, II 72-3, 2.76; Zonaras, XII 21-22; Historia Augusta, vita Val. 2. 1-4.; ŠKZ; 
DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 50-110; Ṭabarī 826-27. MAKSYMIUK (2015: 29-45) provides a good summary 
of these Romano-Persian wars. 
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locals to join the religious community led by Mani and ultimately by the šāhanšāh in 
person. However, at the same time as this happened, Šāpur gave the high priest Kerdīr 
two missions: 1) to protect the Zoroastrians in the lands conquered by the Persians; 2) 
to unite the local Zoroastrian churches into the Persian organization so that they would 
be placed under the Persian clergy
30. In short, it is quite probable that one of Šāpur I’s 
intentions was to use Mani’s message of universal religion as a unifying force for the 
peoples of Iran and non-Iran, because the Persis version of the Zoroastrian faith had 
failed to do the trick in the west and apparently also in the east because Mani made 
several missionary trips to this region too. It is therefore also quite probable that Šāpur 
did not see any conflict between the teachings of Mani and the Zoroastrian religion.  
The fact that Odaenathus faced only “satraps” during his invasion of Persian 
lands in about 266-267 suggests that Šāpur faced troubles in the east just like his 
successor Hormozd. On the basis of this it is clear that whatever measures had been 
taken by Šāpur and Mani to pacify the region that these had failed and probably 
contributed to the problem because Mani fell out of favor. In short, it appears probable 
that the very last years of Šāpur’s rule were spent in the east.  
 
Šāpur’s Successors (271/2-293) and the Rise of Kerdīr 
 
Šāpur was succeeded by his son Hormozd I the Bold (ca. 270/271-272/3), who 
conducted a successful campaign against the Hepthalites or Sogdians. Very little is 
known of Hormozd’s reign besides this, except that he may have held both Mani and 
Zoroastrians in equal honor. Some historians even claim that he was a follower  
of Mani, and that he restored Mani back in favor after his temporary fall from favor 
during the last years of Šāpur’s rule, but this interpretation has not been universally 
accepted because Hormozd promoted Kerdīr’s standing to such an extent that he was in 
the position to decide who would succeed Hormozd. Furthermore, Dīnavarī even 
claims that Mani was killed by Hormozd
31
.  
We are on a more certain ground with Hormozd I’s successor Bahrām I  
 (272/3-275/6) and under his successor Bahrām II (275/6-293). Under Bahrām II 
Kerdīr’s position became so powerful that his picture was included on Bahrām’s 
reliefs. On top of this Bahrām II even handed over to Kerdīr the lordship of the fire of 
Anāhid-Ardašīr at Eṣṭaḵr and of Lady Anahit, which had previously been the sole right 
of the Sasanians. Unsurprisingly, Kerdīr had Mani executed and his followers 
persecuted. He also launched a full-scale persecution of all religions whose doctrines 
                                                          
30 Sources for Šāpur’s wars collected in DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 50-110 with notes; The references to 
Mani and Kerdīr in DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 65 and 135. For Mani’s life, see SUNDERMANN 2009. For 
the Persian religions in general, see esp. DARYAEE 2010: 69-97; POURSHARIATI 2008: 321-395. 
31 Dīnavarī; For Mani, see SUNDERMANN 2009; POURSHARIATI 2008: 331.  
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differed from his version of the Persis Zoroastrianism. His Persis version  
of Zoroastrianism was now the only orthodox religion
32
.  
In my opinion, the strong position of Kerdīr and the weakening of Mani’s 
standing resulted also from the military situation. The Persian rulers were waging wars 
in the east from ca. 272 until 282 while the Romans were threatening them from  
the west. It was thanks to this that Trdat the Great managed to gain a permanent 
foothold in his native Armenia in about 277
33
. Therefore, my ultimately improvable 
educated guess is that the legitimate Sasanian rulers (Bahrām I-II) wanted to secure  
the full support of the military contingents drawn from Persis and the Zoroastrian 
Church by giving Kerdīr their full backing while their enemies in the east sought 
support from the Manicheans.  
 
Ardašīr’s Vision of Iran Re-asserts itself in 293 
 
The change to the situation came under Narseh (293-302) who did not accept 
the nomination of Bahrām III as Bahrām II’s successor. We are lucky to possess  
the Pāikūlī Inscription set up by Narseh I, because it describes the principal events of 
his rise to power. At the time Bahrām II died his son Bahrām III was in Sakastan  
and Narseh in Armenia. Bahrām III succeeded on the throne as his father had wished, 
but this was done without consulting the princes, grandees, nobles, Persians, and 
Parthians. This move angered all of the above. What is notable about this list is  
the omission of the clergy, which implies that the clergy backed Bahrām III, while 
Narseh’ supporters consisted mainly of the feudal nobility. The notables who accepted 
Narseh as ruler asked him to move from Armenia to Ērānšahr (Land of Iran)34 and to 
take the crown. Narseh was backed up by his personal retinue and by the Army of 
Armenia, the Army of Gilan, and by the forces of the noble houses of Sūrēn, Wārāz, 
and Andēgān, while Bahrām III’s forces consisted of the Army of Sakastan and of the 
Army of Mesene and of the forces of the Kārins and of the Prince Pērōz. In other 
words, it was a struggle in which, with the exception of the Kārins, the previous 
enemies of Ardašīr I supported his grandson Narseh against the forces of Persis which 
were now reinforced with the forces of Sakastan, Kārins, Mesene and Pērōz.35  
Narseh adopted a twofold policy to undermine Bahrām’s position. Firstly,  
he adopted the policy of clemency towards all those who would desert Bahrām. 
Secondly, he claimed to rule in the name of Ohrmazd, of all the gods and of the Lady 
Anāhid, and he also reclaimed the title of the Chief of the Eṣṭaḵr temple away from the 
                                                          
32 Chronicle of Arbela 10. For another interpretation, see POURSHARIATI 2008: 327-395. 
33 For the eastern troubles, see DODGEON, LIEU 1991: 71-122; SYVÄNNE 2015a: 169-179. 
34 In this case the wording meant Asorestan/Mesopotamia with its capital at Ctesiphon. 
35 The presence of the Sūrēns among the supporters of Narseh mean probably the Sūrēn Pahlav rather than 
the Sūrēn Pārsīg, because the former appears to have lost their lands in Sakastan/Sistān which was now 
under Bahrām. 
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clergy. This brought results. The Mesopotamian towns which hated the bigoted 
theocracy created by Kerdīr and most of the nobles deserted to Narseh’s side.36  
The fact that the Sasanians were the traditional priests of Anāhid worked to their 
advantage in Persis. In fact, the deserters included even Kerdīr who must have realized 
that it was in his own interest to change sides before he would also fall – he seems to 
have realized that the military forces of Narseh were just too powerful to resist. 
Bahrām tried to restore unity among his followers with a series of religious 
ceremonies, but to no avail. His soldiers deserted and Bahrām was captured. This 
proves that the heritage of the founder of the Sasanian Empire Ardašīr proved stronger 
than the power of the clergy, but at the same this also proves that the power of the king 
of kings always rested on the duality of his control of military forces and religion, but 








In sum, the initial building blocks of Ardašīr for his nation were the Iranian 
nationalism and religion in Fārs, the loyal military following he had secured for 
himself, and the civil war among the Parthians. He used this to great advantage so that 
he was able to build a secure base while the Parthian rulers were fighting against each 
other after which he exploited the divisions among the Parthian nobility to overthrow 
the Parthians. The subdual of the Parthian nobility was secured with a combination  
of military action, clemency and religious control. The reinterpretation of  
the Zoroastrian faith and the Achaemenid past to serve the politico-religious goals  
of Ardašīr formed a part of the process. When Ardašīr attempted to use  
the Achaemenid and Zoroastrian inheritance in the lands outside Ērānšahr, this was 
not effective enough in a situation in which the military forces failed to achieve their 
goals. 
Ardašīr’s son Šāpur I changed the strategy and attempted to unite the non-
Iranians and Iranians under Manichaeism, but when this resulted in further problems in 
the east, the Persis version of Zoroastrianism reasserted itself towards the end of his 
reign with the result that Šāpur I’s immediate successors were entirely reliant on 
Kerdīr’s support. These rulers and Kerdīr, however, overplayed their hand with  
the result that the original vision of Ardašīr, the duality of kingship and religion, 
reasserted itself. Under Narseh the monarchy and the armed forces were once again 
back in power. Ardašīr’s idea may have been to secure his position with this duality in 
which the military forces under the nobility and the magi were constantly competing 
with each other, but in practice this did not work when the nobles and magi found  
a common ground. And we do not have to wait long for this to happen for it was 
                                                          
36 POURSHARIATI 2008: 333. 
37 NPi. 
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already in 309/310 when this happened and the magnates and magi murdered Hormozd 
II (302/3-309/310) and installed his unborn son Šāpur II on the throne38.  
The subsequent history of the Sasanian realm was therefore a constant struggle for 
power between the ruler, magnates and the magi. 
One of the outcomes of the rise of the purist form of Zoroastrianism under  
the Sasanians was the Roman counter reaction in the bigoted form of pagan worship 
under Decius, Valerian and Diocletian and then in the rise of the similarly bigoted form 
of Christianity in the fourth century. The unity of purpose provided by the 
Zoroastrianism required similar unity of purpose from the neighbors. A clear parallel 
development has taken place quite recently in the Islamic world after the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. The rise of the Shiites in Iran and the occupation  
of Afghanistan by the atheist Soviet Union opened up the gates for the rise of  
the Sunni fanaticism. There is always a counter reaction to the rise of some ideology 
or religion. 
 
Any Lessons for Modernity? 
 
The above account suggests that whenever one wants to build a nation,  
the circumstances for it have to be right. In other words, there has to be a crisis which 
has undermined the position of the previous rulers. Furthermore, one needs to find 
some ideological or religious basis for it, which includes the creation of falsified myths 
which are then exploited in a military campaign to unite the core followers. It also 
suggests a need to possess strong armed forces and loyal intelligence services to 
control the newly conquered areas. It also proves that the religion/ideology that is used 
to unite the core areas will probably not be as useful in the annexation of new 
territories in a situation in which the military lacks the means to conquer the territories 
in question.  
The above analysis has also shown that the strengthening of the position of  
the clergy and religion can be a two-edged sword. In the initial stages it can unite  
the people behind the leader, but after the demise of the founding father and his 
immediate successor there clearly existed a danger that the clergy could actually 
overtake the power that belonged to the ruler. It also implies that modern liberal 
democracy would be far too weak as a form of government to resist a nationwide well-
organized and all-powerful clergy such as existed in the Sasanian Empire, because 
even its rulers with their powerful personal armies faced trouble when the clergy was 
able to undermine the loyalty of the rest of the armed forces serving under the nobles. 
The obvious conclusion that one can draw from this is that if one wants to build a new 
nation in a place where the religion already wields significant influence over  
the population, the person needs to undermine its position with a new religion or 
                                                          
38 SYVÄNNE 2015a: 239; SYVÄNNE 2018. 
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ideology that is then used to unite the armed forces behind the founding father. To take 
a modern example, the Arab Socialist movements managed to suppress the power 
wielded by the clerics temporarily when the socialist movement was on the rise. 
However, after socialism/communism had lost its lure and the Soviet Union had 
collapsed in 1991, most of these socialist governments have proven to be too weak to 
resist the religious fanatics especially when these receive support from foreign powers. 
Nowadays, the secular Arab governments can survive only with foreign help, which is 
not that surprising because a secular government cannot co-exist with a religion that 
requires blind obedience from its followers. In order to survive the secular government 
has to use force – quite often brute military force – against the religious fanatics,  
but when such a government uses force it is forced to violate human rights. It is  
the military vs. the clergy just like it was in ancient Iran. Had anyone bothered to study 
the Sasanian example at nation building, this would have been quite obvious to 
everyone. The study and analysis of ancient matters is still relevant and when  
the results of such studies are taken into account properly it would be possible to avoid 
the making of such quite serious mistakes that have been committed by the western 
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Nation and Empire Building the Iranian Way 




The article concentrates its attention on the practical aspects of the nation and empire 
building so that it: 1) Analyzes what methods, means and myths the founder Ardašīr I and his 
immediate successors used in the building of the Iranian nation and then the empire; 2) Provides  
an analysis of the importance of history and religion in the making of national myths so that  
the article analyzes how the Iranian leadership rewrote the past together with its religion for  
the purpose of uniting under their flag all those who spoke the Iranian dialects and/or practiced 
ancient Iranian religions, 3) Investigates what methods the Sasanians used to control  
the subjects; 4) Shows how the original set of falsified historical myths and the core set  
of religious beliefs were altered to meet the changing reality. 5) Asks whether the above 
provides any lessons for modernity.  
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